Tezos talks about its self-amending blockchain

“Tezos presents a self-amending blockchain, addressing the ironic fact that consensus systems often become hamstrung when their own rules need to change.

 

The Tezos team first proposed its “seed protocol” back in 2014, a blockchain protocol offering a voting procedure for stakeholders to approve amendments to the protocol, including changes to the voting procedure itself. In this respect, Tezos is related to the work of philosopher Peter Suber and Nomic, a game he invented which includes mechanisms for players to change the rules, usually beginning through a system of democratic voting….”

Nomic: Interactive Gaming Online and Off | Brainstorm in Progress

“I am looking at games that can be used in online classes that are interactive, engaging and promote collaboration. In online classes, the research says that there is a direct correlation between interactivity in an online class and student success and retention. Games are one way to address the student success and retention issue. Nomic, a game I used in my English classes, is definitely one of those games that are very engaging. The game is very useful at the beginning of the semester because students learn a lot about one another, how to work together in groups, self-organization, and what skills one needs to work effectively in groups. They also learn a little bit about politics and creating decision making processes. There are Nomic games that start out with a lot of rules and there are those that start out with a minimal set….”

Tezos — a self-amending crypto-ledger White paper (Sept 2014)

“We present Tezos, a generic and self-amending crypto-ledger. Tezos can instantiate any blockchain based ledger. The operations of a regular blockchain are implemented as a purely functional module abstracted into a shell responsible for network operations. Bitcoin, Ethereum, Cryptonote, etc. can all be represented within Tezos by implementing the proper interface to the network layer. Most importantly, Tezos supports meta upgrades: the protocols can evolve by amending their own code. To achieve this, Tezos begins with a seed protocol defining a procedure for stakeholders to approve amendments to the protocol, including amendments to the voting procedure itself. This is not unlike philosopher Peter Suber’s Nomic[4], a game built around a fully introspective set of rules….”

Puzzle WINGS. Series # 2: Control systems and solutions markets – Wings.ai DAO blog

From Google’s English: “WINGS DAO self-governing. It is inspired by the ideas of the philosopher Peter Suber (Peter Suber), who created the game Nomic . The game consists of immutable and mutable rule, it illustrates the power and logic systems samoispravlyayuschihsya priorities when setting rules of the game. (can be compared with the inviolability of the Constitution and the periodic change in regulatory laws). We suggest using a combination of Futarhii (prediction markets) and Liquid Democracy (power redistribution forecasting) for TAO with a view to the selection of key decisions, such as the placement of a new or updated DAO smart WINGS platform contracts….”

Puzzle WINGS. Series # 2: Control systems and solutions markets – Wings.ai DAO blog

From Google’s English: “WINGS DAO self-governing. It is inspired by the ideas of the philosopher Peter Suber (Peter Suber), who created the game Nomic . The game consists of immutable and mutable rule, it illustrates the power and logic systems samoispravlyayuschihsya priorities when setting rules of the game. (can be compared with the inviolability of the Constitution and the periodic change in regulatory laws). We suggest using a combination of Futarhii (prediction markets) and Liquid Democracy (power redistribution forecasting) for TAO with a view to the selection of key decisions, such as the placement of a new or updated DAO smart WINGS platform contracts….”

When Do Rule Changes Count-as Legal Rule Changes?

Abstract. Institutions regulate societies. Comprising Searle’s constitutive counts-as rules, “A counts-as B in context C”, an institution ascribes from brute and institutional facts (As), a social reality comprising institutional facts (Bs) conditional on the social reality (contexts Cs). When brute facts change an institution evolves from one social reality to the next. Rule changes are also regulated by rule-modifying counts-as rules ascribing rule change in the past/present/future (e.g. a majority rule change vote counts-as a rule change). Determining rule change legality is difficult, since changing counts-as rules both alters and is conditional on the social reality, and in some cases hypothetical rule-change effects (e.g. not retroactively criminalising people). However, without a rigorous account of rule change ascriptions, AI agents cannot support humans in understanding the laws imposed on them. Moreover, advances in automated governance design for socio-technical systems, are limited by agents’ ability to understand how and when to enact institutional changes. Consequently, we answer “when do rule changes count-as legal rule changes?” in a temporal setting with a novel formal framework. 

When Do Rule Changes Count-as Legal Rule Changes?

Abstract. Institutions regulate societies. Comprising Searle’s constitutive counts-as rules, “A counts-as B in context C”, an institution ascribes from brute and institutional facts (As), a social reality comprising institutional facts (Bs) conditional on the social reality (contexts Cs). When brute facts change an institution evolves from one social reality to the next. Rule changes are also regulated by rule-modifying counts-as rules ascribing rule change in the past/present/future (e.g. a majority rule change vote counts-as a rule change). Determining rule change legality is difficult, since changing counts-as rules both alters and is conditional on the social reality, and in some cases hypothetical rule-change effects (e.g. not retroactively criminalising people). However, without a rigorous account of rule change ascriptions, AI agents cannot support humans in understanding the laws imposed on them. Moreover, advances in automated governance design for socio-technical systems, are limited by agents’ ability to understand how and when to enact institutional changes. Consequently, we answer “when do rule changes count-as legal rule changes?” in a temporal setting with a novel formal framework. 

Democratic Sportsmanship Contested Games and Political Ethics | Andrew Sabl – Academia.edu

Abstract: One of the central virtues in a democracy is what might be called democraticsportsmanship: a willingness to lose gracefully and still keep playing. Nothingis more common, however, than for different political actors to see one anotheras bad sports. This essay explores, and distinguishes, three different reasons why con?ict can occur. Players can disagree over how the game should best be played; over which game is being played; or over the degree to which settled rules are desirable in the ?rst place. In the ?rst case, arguments among playersand spectators are more tractable than they seem, even salutary. In the second, they are less salutary but also less dangerous than commonly thought, due to modern polities’ ability to mix games and to adopt side constraints independent of the rules of any particular game. The third case is more dangerous but alsoan occupational hazard only of leaders, who must be brought to appreciatethe virtues of settled rules and institutionalized roles on grounds that mostordinary citizens already recognize.

Tezos: A Self-Amending Crypto-Ledger Position Paper

“The popularization of Bitcoin, a decentralized, trustless, crypto-currency has inspired the production of several alternative, or \alt”, currencies. Ethereum, CryptoNote, and Zerocash all represent unique contributions to the crypto-currency space. Although most alt currencies harbor their own source of innovation, they have no means of adopting the innovations of other currencies which may succeed them. We aim to remedy the po- tential for atrophied evolution in the crypto-currency space by presenting Tezos, a generic and self-amending crypto-ledger. Tezos can instanciate any blockchain based protocol. Its seed protocol speci es a procedure for stakeholders to approve amendments to the proto- col, including amendments to the amendment procedure itself. Upgrades to Tezos are staged through a testing environment to allow stakeholders to recall potentially problematic amendments. The philosophy of Tezos is inspired by Peter Suber’s Nomic[1], a game built around a fully introspective set of rules. In this paper, we hope to elucidate the potential bene ts of Tezos, our choice to implement as a proof-of-stake system, and our choice to write it in OCaml.”