Abstract: One of the central virtues in a democracy is what might be called democraticsportsmanship: a willingness to lose gracefully and still keep playing. Nothingis more common, however, than for different political actors to see one anotheras bad sports. This essay explores, and distinguishes, three different reasons why con?ict can occur. Players can disagree over how the game should best be played; over which game is being played; or over the degree to which settled rules are desirable in the ?rst place. In the ?rst case, arguments among playersand spectators are more tractable than they seem, even salutary. In the second, they are less salutary but also less dangerous than commonly thought, due to modern polities’ ability to mix games and to adopt side constraints independent of the rules of any particular game. The third case is more dangerous but alsoan occupational hazard only of leaders, who must be brought to appreciatethe virtues of settled rules and institutionalized roles on grounds that mostordinary citizens already recognize.
“The popularization of Bitcoin, a decentralized, trustless, crypto-currency has inspired the production of several alternative, or \alt”, currencies. Ethereum, CryptoNote, and Zerocash all represent unique contributions to the crypto-currency space. Although most alt currencies harbor their own source of innovation, they have no means of adopting the innovations of other currencies which may succeed them. We aim to remedy the po- tential for atrophied evolution in the crypto-currency space by presenting Tezos, a generic and self-amending crypto-ledger. Tezos can instanciate any blockchain based protocol. Its seed protocol speci es a procedure for stakeholders to approve amendments to the proto- col, including amendments to the amendment procedure itself. Upgrades to Tezos are staged through a testing environment to allow stakeholders to recall potentially problematic amendments. The philosophy of Tezos is inspired by Peter Suber’s Nomic, a game built around a fully introspective set of rules. In this paper, we hope to elucidate the potential bene ts of Tezos, our choice to implement as a proof-of-stake system, and our choice to write it in OCaml.”